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McDonald: McDonald: Role of Legislative History

The Role of Legislative History in

Statutory Interpretation:
A New Era After the Resignation of

Justice William Brennan?
Public Citizen v. Departmentof Justice1
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years courts have battled with the practice of consulting
legislative history when interpreting statutes. In a quest for the "true intent"
of the legislature, some judges routinely turn to the legislative history, while
others believe that legislative history offers little guidance. This discord
among the judiciary has sparked prolific commentary within the legal
community over the appropriate use of legislative history in the judicial
decision-making process.
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has come under attack
from Justice Antonin Scalia for excessive reliance on legislative history.
Although the Supreme Court has never developed a uniform practice toward
the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, several Justices
routinely rely on legislative history. 2 In particular, recently-retired Justice
William Brennan was a staunch supporter of consulting legislative materials?
This Comment uses Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, an opinion
authored by Justice Brennan, as a vehicle for illustrating the sharp division
within the Supreme Court over the appropriate role of legislative history in
statutory interpretation. In Public Citizen, the majority avoided the plain
language of a statute through selective analysis of legislative materials to

interpret the statute without creating a constitutional conflict.4
As a basis for the discussion, this Comment will concentrate on past and
present Supreme Court decisions highlighting general approaches in the use
of legislative history in statutory interpretation. In particular, the Comment
will focus on differing viewpoints within the present Supreme Court, including
Justice Scalia, an outspoken critic of the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation. Finally, the Comment will discuss the current controversy
between scholars on the benefits and dangers of consulting legislative history.

1. 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989).
2. Costello, Reliance on Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes,CRS REVIEW
29 (Jan.-Feb. 1990).
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 138-69 and accompanying text.
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II. FACTUAL OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC CITIZEN
Since 1952, the Department of Justice has obtained evaluations and
recommendations of prospective federal judicial nominees from the American
Bar Association Standing Committee, in an effort to aid the President of the
United States in his constitutional duty of appointing federal judges. 5
In 1988, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF), a non-profit public
interest law center, brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, against the Department of Justice regarding its use of the
American Bar Association Standing Committee (Standing Committee).6 The
WLF sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the Standing
Committee was an "advisory committee" as defined by the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA) and therefore subject to FACA regulations.7
The FACA was passed by Congress in 1972 to impose certain requirements on committees or other groups which are established or utilized by the
President or federal agencies to obtain advice or recommendations.8
Requirements of the FACA include: the filing of a charter, the keeping of
meeting minutes, attendance at the meetings by an officer or employee of the
Federal Government, advance notice and public openness of meetings as a
rule, and the public availability of records consonant with the Freedom of
Information Act.9 Generally, the purposes of the FACA were to enhance the
public accountability of advisory committees established by the executive
branch, and to reduce wasteful expenditures on them.' °
The American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary is an incorporated association established by the American Bar
Association." The Standing Committee is a private organization which does
not receive funds from any government agency.'" Since 1948, the Standing
Committee has reviewed qualifications of prospective federal judicial

5. Washington Legal Found. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 691 F. Supp. 483,
488-89 (D. D.C. 1988).
6. Id. at 484-85. Plaintiff, Public Citizen, successfully intervened. Id. In 1986,
the WLF brought suit against the American Bar Association Standing Committee and
its individual members. The case was dismissed because FACA does not permit suit
by one private party against another private party.

Washington Legal Found. v.

American Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Fed. Judiciary, 648 F. Supp. 1353 (D. D.C.
1986).
7. Washington Legal Found. v. Dep't of Justice, 691 F. Supp. at 484-85.

8. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2562.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Washington Legal Found. v. ABA, 648 F. Supp. at 1354.
12. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/11
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nominees "identified" by the President through the Department of Justice. 3
Specifically, the President's federal judicial selection committee, through the
Department of Justice, requests the Standing Committee to investigate and
evaluate potential nominees. 4
In reviewing the judicial nominees, the Standing Committee conducts
confidential interviews with various persons in the nominee's community and
gives "close scrutiny" to the nominee's legal writings. 15 All information
obtained through the review process is kept confidential by the American Bar
Association (ABA). 6 At the end of the review process, a final report is
submitted to the Standing Committee chairperson, and each Committee
member votes on one of four ratings to be given the nominee: "'exceptionally
well qualified,' 'well qualified,' 'qualified,' or 'not qualified.""' 7 The final
rating is submitted to the Department of Justice, and the contents of the report
are kept confidential by the ABA.' 8
The WLF argued that under the requirements of the FACA the Standing
Committee was required, inter alia, to give advance notice of its meetings, to
open meetings to the public and to provide public access to the Committee's
records.' 9 In response, the Standing Committee argued, inter alia, that the
WLF's construction of the FACA was too broad. They argued the Standing
Committee did not constitute an "advisory committee" within the FACA, and
furthermore, the application of the FACA to the Standing Committee violated
the separation of powers doctrine by limiting the President's freedom to
nominate federal judges.2 °
The district court dismissed the WFL claim, holding that although the
Department of Justice utilizes the Standing Committee as an advisory
committee within the meaning of the FACA, the FACA could not be
constitutionally applied to the Standing Committee because art. II, section 2,
cl. 2 of the Constitution requires that "the President alone shall nominate
candidates for federal judgeships."2 '
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the district court
in a 5-3-0 decision in which Justice Scalia did not participate.' The Court
held that the Standing Committee did not constitute an advisory committee

13. Id. at 1355.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Washington Legal Found. v. Dep't of Justice, 691 F. Supp. at 486.
Washington Legal Found. v. ABA, 648 F. Supp. at 1354.
Id.
Id. at 1355.
Id.

19. Public Citizen, 109 S.Ct. at 2562-63.
20. Id. at 2563.
21. Washington Legal Found. v. Dep't of Justice, 691 F. Supp. at 496.
22. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2558.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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within the meaning the FACA because, although a literal reading of the FACA
would encompass the advisory relationship of the Standing Committee, the
legislative history of the FACA did not reveal an intent by Congress to widen
the scope of the FACA to include such a relationship.3 Furthermore, the
Court stated that to construe the FACA to apply to the Standing Committee
would create serious constitutional difficulties regarding the separation of

powers doctrine.24 The Court refused to address such a question when the
text and legislative history of the FACA revealed competing arguments that
Congress did not intend the FACA to encompass such a relationship.5
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor,
concurred in judgment only, claiming that the plain language of the statute
compelled the inclusion of the Standing Committee.6 Furthermore, he
criticized the Court's willingness to use legislative history because the
language of the statute was clear.27 Justice Kennedy would have found that
the FACA applied to the government's use of the Standing Committee but that
such an application was unconstitutional.2
III. APPROACHES TO THE USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

In the judicial decisionmaking process, the primary and constitutional role
of the court is to ascertain the meaning of a statute as intended by the
legislative body responsible for its enactment. 29 While many "canons" of
statutory construction exist to guide a court in the direction of the legislative
intent, there fails to be a consensus as to the correct theory of statutory
interpretation. 0 When the specific issue of whether to consult legislative

23. Id. at 2573.
24. Id. at 2572.
25. Id. at 2573.
26. Id. at 2574.

27. Id. at 2580.
28. Id. at 2580-84.
29. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 13

(1975). The constitutional role of the judiciary in interpreting statutes is mandated by
the separation of powers doctrine in article I of the United States Constitution. Id. at
7-8. As a forum to resolve ambiguities in the statutes, the judicial branch "must
remain appropriately deferential to the properly promulgated views of the legislature."
Id. at 8. Therefore, "any conflict between the legislative will and the judicial will must
be resolved in favor of the former," unless the statute is held to be unconstitutional.
Id.

30. Id. at 1. "The hard truth of the matter is that American Courts have no
intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation." Id. (quoting H.
ed. 1958)).

HART, JR.

& A.

SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1201
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history arises, the decisionmaking process is commonly hampered by
controversy and lack of uniform agreement between the deciding judges.
This section will focus on several principles of interpretation utilized by
the Supreme Court, and problems that arise with the use of legislative history.
In the primary stage of statutory interpretation, the initial problem faced by
most courts is the question of when it is appropriate to consult legislative
materials. Secondly, assuming the legislative history of a statute should be
analyzed, which materials are relevant and reliable sources of information?
A. Should Extrinsic MaterialsBe Consulted?
Probably the most controversial area of statutory interpretation is deciding
at what point, if at all, it is appropriate to consider extrinsic materials in
interpreting a statute. As a guideline for interpretation, the judiciary has
fashioned a well-known maxim called the "plain-meaning rule."0' The
"plain-meaning rule" requires that if the words of a statute are clear, and the

construction of those words will not lead to an absurd result,3 2the words are

assumed to be the "final expression of the meaning intended.
In Caminetti v. United States, 33 the Supreme Court refused to consult
legislative materials in construing the apparently clear words of the Mann
Act.3 ' The question was whether the Mann Act, which prohibited taking a
woman across state lines for "prostitution or debauchery, or for 'any other
immoral purpose'," was intended to cover non-commercial acts. 35 Although
there was clear evidence in the legislative history that Congress was targeting
"white slave traffic" and not non-commercial activities, the Court upheld the
convictions based on the plain language of the statute.36 The Court refused
to consult the legislative materials stating:
when words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression
of the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by
considerations drawn from titles or designating names or 37reports accompanying their introduction, or from any extraneous source.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 277-78 (1929).
Id. at 278.
242 U.S. 470 (1917).
Id. at 485.
Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490.
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The dissent in Caminetti illustrated a common problem plaguing statutory
interpretation-judges often disagree over whether a word is unambiguous.38
The dissent claimed that the purpose of the phrase "for any other immoral
purpose" was not a clear and unambiguous phrase, and therefore, the use of
39
This
legislative materials was necessary in order to interpret the Act.
debate over the ambiguity of words highlights the obvious problem that a
single word may have several meanings, or provide inconsistent inferences
depending on the perception of an individual judge.40
Although the "plain-meaning rule" provides a guideline for the limitation
of the use of legislative history, most courts have not strictly applied the
principle. 4 A critic of the "plain-meaning rule," Judge Learned Hand, noted
that although the words of a statute are the most "decisive evidence" of what
"[t]here is no surer way to misread any document than to
Congress intended,
42
read it literally."
A 1940 Supreme Court decision attacked the plain-meaning approach. 3
In United States v. American Trucking Association,44 the Supreme Court
fashioned a new standard for the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation. In this case, the Court had to determine whether the word
"employee" in the Motor Carrier Act gave power to the Interstate Commerce
Commission to establish reasonable requirements for qualifications and
maximum hours for employees whose duties did not affect the safety of
operations. 45 The Court noted that although the meaning of the words were
plain, application of the literal meaning of the words would be "[a]t variance
with the policy of the legislation as a whole."46 As a result, the Court
disregarded the plain meaning approach by stating "when aid to construction
of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly

38. Id. at 496-503.
39. Id. at 496-97.
40. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (finding the language much more ambiguous than the Court); Nutting, The
Ambiguity of UnambiguousStatutes, 24 MINN. L. REV. 509, 509-14 (1940).
41. Jones, Extrinsic Aides in the Federal Courts, 25 IowA L. REV. 737, 737
(1940) (the plain-meaning rule has been "greatly relaxed" in practice); Wald, Some
Observationson the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68
IOWA L. REV. 195, 197-98 (1983) (Although the words "'plain meaning' linger[] on
in Court opinions .... its spirit is gone".).
42. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944).
43. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-MeaningRule" and Statutory
Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1298, 1301
(1975).
44. 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
45. Id. at 538.
46. Id. at 543-45 (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 195 (1922)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/11
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can be no 'rule of law' which forbids
its use, however clear the words may
'
,47
examination.
'superficial
on
appear
A famous 1892 Supreme Court decision which advocated the liberal use
of legislative history was the vintage case of Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States.48 In this case, the Court faced the issue whether the Act of
February 26, 1885, which prohibited the importation of foreigners to perform
labor in the United States, applied to an ordained minister.49 In looking to
the legislative purpose of the statute, the Court rejected the literal words by
claiming "[i]t is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the

statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within
the intention of its makers.150
Although decisions like Holy Trinity and American Trucking opened the
door to the use of extrinsic materials in statutory interpretation, subsequent
Supreme Court decisions reaffirmed various forms of the plain-meaning
approach. 51materials Particularly, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Public Utilities Commission2 stated in dictum that the use of legislative
history was only "proper" when the language of the statute is ambiguous or
the result is absurd.53 Furthermore, in Gemsco Inc. v. Walling, " the
Supreme Court restricted the use of legislative history by stating that "[tihe
plain words and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a legislative
history which, through strained process of deduction from events of wholly
ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every
5
direction.
B. What Materials Should Be Consulted?
Once the court establishes the need to resort to extrinsic materials, it must
then answer the question of which materials the court should consult for
guidance of legislative intent. The materials most commonly considered
include committee hearings and reports, floor debates, and post-enactment
legislation. As a general rule, one scholar expressed three standards for

47. American Trucking, 310 U.S. at 543-44 (citations omitted).
48. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
49. Id. at 457-58.
50. Id. at 459.
51. Murphy, supra note 43, at 1302.
52. 345 U.S. 295 (1953).
53. Id. at 315-16. See also United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961);
Exparte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949) (finding no need to resort to the use of legislative
history because the provisions of the statute were clear and unequivocal).
54. 324 U.S. 244 (1945).
55. Id. at 260.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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materials should be used: "relevance, competence,
measuring the extent such
56
and probative value.,
The most reliable form of legislative history in determining legislative
intent is the committee report

7

Other materials such as testimony during

committee hearings or floor debates are considered less reliable sources of
information.5 8 Despite the criticism and questionable reliability of the
different types of legislative history available, however, courts regularly
consult a wide range of legislative materials.5 9
Most courts agree that the legislative materials consulted should be
reliable and relevant, but few agree as to which materials meet the criteria.
In the decision of Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers,6° Justice Jackson

expressed his view that legislative history should only be used where the face
of the Act is "inescapably ambiguous." 61 He further stated that the use of
extrinsic materials should not reach beyond Committee reports.62 In
criticizing the use of other type of materials, he warned that "to select casual
statements from floor debates, not always distinguished for candor or
accuracy, as a basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended to
enact is to63substitute ourselves for the Congress in one of its important
functions.,

In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,64 the Supreme Court relied
heavily on the legislative history of Title IX of the Educational Amendments
of 1972 to determine whether the words "no person" included employees as
well as students.65 The Court focused on various forms of legislative

56. R. DICKERSON, supra note 29, at 140 (citing F. NEWMAN & S. SURREY,
LEGISLATION-CASES AND MATERIALs, 669-71 (1955) (suggested standards by Henry
M. Hart, Jr.)).
57. Wald, supra note 41, at 201 (citing Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers,
341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)); J. HURST, DEALING WITH
STATUTES 42-43 (1982) (the committee is the "workplace in which members have
hammered out the particular content of the measure"). For an in depth discussion on
various types of legislative history and their respective importance in the judicial
decisionmaking process, see Costello, Sources of Legislative History As Aides to

Statutory Construction,CRS Report for Congress (January 27, 1990).
58. J. HURST, supra note 57, at 43 (Debates are "fragmentary, subject to
members' off-floor 'amendment' of their remarks, and blurred by diversity of views
which may go without ordered challenge or review".).
59. Wald, supra note 41, at 203.
60. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
61. Id. at 395.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
65. Id. at 520-22.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/11
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materials such as the prepared remarks by Senator Bay during debate which
were a summary of the amendment introduced after its passage.6 The Court
also used the Conference Committee report noting that the House withdrew
from an amendment that expressly excluded employees. 67
Another hotly debated topic is whether post-enactment statements are a
reliable source of legislative intent.(8 The use of postenactment statements
is questioned because the legislative "intent" to be inferred comes from an
entirely different group of legislators, and under different circumstances. 69
While the reliability of subsequent history is questionable, 0 courts give
some deference to such postenactment materials.71 For example, in Bobsee
Corp. v. United States, 72 the Fifth Circuit commented on the use of postenactment statements stating that "these subsequent legislative statements are
not part of the history.... However, [they are) entitled to some consideration
as a secondarily authoritative expression of expert opinion. " 73 Likewise, in
GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert,74 the Supreme Court faced the issue whether
EEOC guidelines, issued eight years after the passage of the statute, were
entitled to any consideration in determining legislative intent. 75 Although the
Court conceded that the agency guidelines were entitled to some consideration,
the guidelines warranted "less weight" because they were post-enactment
statements. 76 In other cases, post-enactment statements were completely
disregarded as having no probative weight in statutory interpretation.'

66. Id. at 531.
67. Id. at 527-30.
68. R. DICKERSON, supra note 29, at 179.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 180.
71. Wald, supra note 41, at 204.
72. 411 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1969).
73. Id. at 237 n.18 (citation omitted).
74. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
75. Id. at 141.
76. Id. at 141 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975);
Espinoza v. Faroh Mfg: Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973); Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316
U.S. 481, 484 (1942)).
77. See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); Bread
Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 582 n.3 (1982) (majority rejected an
affidavit regarding the intent of the original amendment as having little probative
weight; the views were made public after the passage of the Act and were regarded as
merely personal).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Some Viewpoints on the PresentSupreme Court
Before the resignation of Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court generally
maintained a fair balance of viewpoints on the use of legislative history. The
Justices most likely to support a literalistic approach and to avoid reliance
upon legislative materials are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Scalia, Kennedy and sporadically, Justice O'Connor.78 At the same time,
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and the now-retired Justice Brennan
more consistently turned to legislative history regardless of the ambiguity of
the statute in question.79
Leading the charge against unnecessary use of legislative history is
Justice Scalia.8" Justice Scalia advocates relying on only the statutory text
when possible because he believes legislative history is an inadequate record
his view, legislators abuse the political process
of legislative intent.81 In hsve
when they use legislative history as a vehicle to foster the views of private
interest groups and as a means to mislead judges. 82 Furthermore, he
criticizes the legislators for delegating their responsibilities to unelected staff
members.83
Although Justice Scalia's view on legislative history has been highlighted
by his appointment to the Supreme Court, his views were formed at the
In
appellate level when he sat with the District of Columbia Circuit.'
Hirschey v. FERC,85 then-Judge Scalia discussed a House Committee Report86
which noted a split in the court of appeals in the interpretation of a statute.
The Committee Report criticized the Ninth Circuit interpretation of the statute,
labeling it erroneous.87 In rejecting the use of the Committee Report in

78. Costello, supra note 2.
79. Id.
80. Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423,
437 (1988).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 437-38.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Consumers Union, Inc. v. FTC, 801 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil, 796 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Church of
Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1985); City of Cleveland v. FERC, 773 F.2d. 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
85. 777 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
86. Id. at 7 (discussing H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1985)).
87. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/11
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interpreting the statute, Judge Scalia was unpersuaded of its authoritative
nature because he "doubt[s] that it is ever reasonable to assume that the
details, as opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a committee
report come to the attention of, much less are approved by the house which
enacts the committee's bill. " '
To evidence the lack of knowledge of
members of Congress regarding the details of legislation, Judge Scalia cited
a colloquy between two senators during a floor debate on a tax bill.8 9 It was
apparent that the senator who was the tax bill committee chairman had not

88. Id.
89. Id. at 7 n.1 (citing 128 CONG. REc. S8659 (daily ed. July 19, 1982)). The
footnote read, in part:
Mr. ARMSTRONG .... My question, which may take [the chairman of the
Committee of Finance] by surprise, is this: Is it the intention of the
chairman that the Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court and other
courts take guidance as to the intention of Congress from the committee
report which accompanies this bill?
Mr. DOLE. I would certainly hope so....
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, will the Senator tell me whether or not
he wrote the committee report?
Mr. DOLE. Did I write the committee report?
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes.
Mr. DOLE. No; the Senator from Kansas did not write the committee
report.
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did any Senator write the committee report?
Mr. DOLE. I have to check.
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Does the Senator know of any Senator who wrote the
committee report?
Mr. DOLE. I might be able to identify one, but I would have to search..
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, has the Senator from Kansas, the
chairman of the Finance Committee, read the committee report in its
entirety?
Mr. DOLE. I am working on it. It is not a best seller, but I am working
on it.
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, did members of the Finance Committee
vote on the committee report?
Mr. DOLE. No.
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, the reason I raise the issue is not
perhaps apparent on the surface, and let me just state it: .... [F]or any
jurist, administrator, bureaucrat, tax practitioner, or others who might
happen to chance upon the written record of this proceeding, let me just
make the point that this is not the law, it was not voted on, it is not subject
to amendment, and we should discipline ourselves to the task of expressing
congressional intent in the statute.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 11

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

written90much less read all of the committee report that was on the floor for
debate.
In speeches given at several law schools between 1985 and 1986, Justice
Scalia advocated the selective use of legislative history. 9' If legislative
history must be consulted, he believes the most reliable sources of information
are amendments defeated on the floor, and the least reliable sources are the
committee reports. 92
As a Supreme Court Justice, Scalia criticized the Court's use of
legislative history in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. CardozaFonseca.3 In this case, although the plain language of the statute apparently
settled the question,94 the Court looked to the legislative history to determine
whether there was legislative intent contradicting the language. 95 Although
concurring in judgment, Justice Scalia criticized the Court's use of legislative
history, warning "[j]udges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators
intentions. Where the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to
replace it with an unenacted legislative intent."' 9
In a recent decision, Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,97 the Court

was faced with construing a Federal Rule of Evidence which, if read literally,
would produce an absurd result.9 Justice Scalia would have advocated the
use of legislative history only to confirm that the absurd result was never
contemplated by Congress." Instead, the majority relied on the legislative
and historical background of the Rule to determine precisely what the Rule
meant.'O°
Justice Scalia criticized the majority's approach because he
believed that few members of Congress were aware of the historical evolution
of the Rule, much less voted on the Rule with knowledge of the details of the
Committee Reports or floor debates.' 0'

90. Id.
91. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 80, at 442 (citing Address by Judge Antonin
Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History (copy on file with the Virginia Law

Review Ass'n)). Justice Scalia noted that if he were starting over again, he might
reject any use of legislative history in statutory construction. Id.
92. Id. at n.64.
93. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
94. Id. at 430.

95. Id. at 432 n.12.
96. Id. at 452-53.
97. 109 S. Ct. 1981 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 1994 (Scalia, J., concurring).
99. Id.
100. Id. Justice Scalia was concerned that the majority devoted nearly four-fifths
of their analysis to interpreting the legislative history. Id.
101. Id.
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Although Justice Scalia firmly supports a literal approach to statutory
construction, his views have come under fire by scholars on the subject." 2

Critics concede that if the statute were unambiguous Justice Scalia's strict
approach would have merit. 0 3 The scholars contend, however, that there

are many more cases where the language is ambiguous or is susceptible to
more than one meaning.'04 In this more common situation, they argue that
Justice Scalia's method offers little guidance for interpretation. 0 5
Following in the footsteps of Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy has
indicated his support for a literalistic approach to statutory interpretation. For
example, in Patterson v. McLean,c 6 Justice Kennedy narrowly construed a
civil rights statute to prohibit an action for racial harassment pertaining to
conditions of employment. 0 7 Without the aid of legislative history, Justice
Kennedy applied a literalistic approach in holding that the phrase "same right
to make and enforce contracts" only applied to conduct which impaired the
right to "make" or "enforce" contracts, not conduct which occurred after the
formation of a contract.0 s In angry dissents, Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens criticized the majority's strict reliance on the text of
the statute, while ignoring the available legislative history.c 9
Justice O'Connor has also shown support for the plain-meaning approach
to statutory interpretation. In Hallstrom v. Tillamook, 0 Justice O'Connor
strictly applied the plain language of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 to bar a cause of action because the petitioner failed to comply
with a sixty-day notice requirement."'
Justice O'Connor rejected
petitioner's claim that a literal interpretation would defeat Congress' intent by
noting "'[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,' the
words of the statute are conclusive."" 2 Only Justices Marshall and Brennan
expressed an opposing view in the decision. In their dissent, they attacked the

102. Farber and Frickey, supra note 80, at 443-52.
103. Id. at 457.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 458.
106. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).

107. Id. at 2374. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices White, O'Connor and Scalia. Id. at 2368.
108. Id. at 2374.
109. Id. at 2386-88.
110. 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989).

111. Id. at 311.
112. Id. at 310 (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
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majority's approach stating113that it "[did] nothing to advance its analysis," and
defeated Congress' intent.
As illustrated by Public Citizen, the literalistic approach does not always
win favor with the Supreme Court. In the past several years, however,
conservative appointments to the Supreme Court have led to greater emphasis
on the structure and text of a statute.11 4 In its unanimous decision in United
Savings Association v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.," 5 the
Court interpreted a section of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with the rights of
secured creditors, finding that an undersecured creditor is not allowed interest
on its collateral pending the stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 362(d)(1).'16
In writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia noted "[s]tatutory
construction .. .is a holistic endeavor.' 117 He explained that although a
statutory provision "may seem ambiguous in isolation," the disputed word or
phrase may be clarified in the context of the entire statute.'
After forming

an interpretation from the structure of the statute, Justice Scalia rejected
petitioner's reliance on the legislative history, claiming that generalizations
from legislative history were "inadequate to overcome the plain textual
indication" by Congress.1 9
B. The Scholarly Debate
Through the years, scholars have argued about the dangers and benefits
of relying on legislative history in the quest to determine the "true intent" of
the legislature.' 20 Although most courts defer the use of legislative history
until a "significant uncertainty" is established, 21 widespread use of extrinsic
materials continues."2
Several scholars documented the frequency of Supreme Court references
to legislative history from 1938 to 1978, and found a steady increase in the

113. Id. at 314-15.
114. Costello, supra note 2, at 30.
115. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
116. Id. at 382.
117. Id. at 371.

118. Id.
119. Id. at 379-80.

120. Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11
HoFsTRA L. REV. 1125 (1983).
121. Id. at 1137.

122. Carro & Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use ofLegislativeHistory:
A StatisticalAnalysis, 22 JURIMarics J.294, 302 (1982) (a statistical survey of the
number of citations to legislative history by the Supreme Court per year from 1938
through 1979).
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use of legislative history over the years.123 In 1938, the Supreme Court
referred to legislative history in a total of nineteen cases. 24 From that year,
the use of legislative history increased in a cyclical pattern to a maximum of
445 citations in 1974.125 The types of legislative materials receiving the
most citations during the period were House Reports, Senate Reports, and the
Congressional Record, which together comprised over sixty-five percent of the
total citations. 126
Because the widespread use of legislative history has played such a major
role in interpreting statutes, scholars have become concerned with the
attendant dangers. Judge Starr, a noted critic of the use of legislative history,
27
argued that the use of legislative history distorts the democratic process.'
In his view, the vast amount of records available were only relevant to
determine the intent of a small number of those in Congress128 Furthermore, the committees that compile the various reports tend to have a "narrow"
focus, and are less balanced in their views than Congress as a whole. 129 As
a result, courts run the risk of relying on materials that are unrepresentative
and may not reflect the understanding of the entire Congress. 3
Judge Starr also noted the "practical concerns" of using legislative history
in that there is a great opportunity for manipulation of the materials by the
courts.13 1 Such reliance on the legislative history has permitted courts to

3
conveniently "find" the answers they seek in legislative materials. 1

Furthermore, with pressures from lobbyists and other interest groups, the
legislation is often a product fashioned to embrace the views of such

123. Id. In the 1981 Supreme Court Term, the Court discussed at least some
aspect of legislative history in almost half of the opinions. Wald, supra note 41, at
196.
124. Carro & Brann, supra note 122, at 298, 309.

125. Id. at 303.
126. Id. at 299, 304. Between 1971-1979, Justices Brennan and Marshall cited
to legislative history 436 and 464 times respectively. In contrast, Justice Burger cited
to legislative history only 176 times within the same time period. Id. at 306.
127. Starr, Observationsabout the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J.

371, 375.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 376.
132. Id. One scholar claims that there is "the danger of inventing fictitious and
fanciful legislative purposes" when a court is attempting to interpret a statute. R.
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
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groups."' In the end, the benefits gained from the use of legislative
materials are far less than the potential for abuse of such materials.""
In contrast, other scholars have revealed the necessary realities of turning
to legislative history for guidance when legislative intent is at issue. As Judge
Mikva noted, there are many instances where Congress uses ambiguous or
"fuzzy" language. Therefore, the judge must look to the appropriate legislative

history to determine what Congress meant. 3 5 Likewise, as another scholar
argued, with the "frailty of language" and the "hectic and compromising nature
of the legislative process" there is often a discrepancy between what the36
legislators intended and what was codified in the language of the statute.
The reality is that the words of the statute are "conditioned by the context
in
137
which they are uttered," and legislative history is a part of that context.
C. The Public Citizen Decision
1. Majority
In Public Citizen, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) sought a
declaratory judgment that the Standing Committee was an "advisory
committee" within the meaning of the FACA, and therefore subject to FACA
regulation. 3 1 In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Brennan relied
heavily on an interpretation of legislative history to find that the plain
language of the FACA did not encompass the Standing Committee advisory
39
relationship to the President.1
Section 3(2) of the FACA, defines advisory committee:
For the purposes of this Act-

(2) The term "advisory committee" means any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any
subcommittee or other subgroup thereof..., which is-

(A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or
(3) established or utilized by the President, or

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Starr, supra note 127, at 377.
Id. at 379.
Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DuKE L.J. 380, 382.
Dickerson, supra note 120, at 1126.
Id.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

139. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2573.
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(C) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the
interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the Presi140
dent.
In construing the bare words of the statute, the Court noted an ancient
decision, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,'4 ' which stated:
[F]requently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad
enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole
legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the
absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words,
makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the
1 42
particular act.

The Court in Public Citizen agreed that the Standing Committee furnished
"advice or recommendations" to the President through the Justice Department.
The Court claimed, however, that for purposes of the FACA, whether the
ABA Committee was an "advisory committee" depended on whether the
Committee was "utilized" by the President as intended by Congress.'43
Although the Court admitted that without a doubt the President "utilizes"
the Standing Committee in "one common sense meaning of the term," the
Court claimed that the word "[u]tilize is a woolly verb" with "its contours left
undefined by the statute.""' The Court explained that if the statute were
read literally, the FACA would encompass almost any organization which the
President formally or informally consults for advice, including his own
political party. 45 Applying the rationale of Holy Trinity, the Court concluded that this was surely a result unintended by Congress when the FACA was
enacted. 46
With the doctrine of Holy Trinity at its disposal, the Court swiftly
discarded the traditional "plain meaning" approach to statutory construction.
Citing several opinions critical of the "plain meaning" doctrine, 47 the Court
turned to their recent decision of Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.14

140. 5 U.S.C.S. App. § 3(2) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
141. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).

142. Id. at 459.
143. Public Citizen, 109 S. Ct. at 2565.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2565-66.
146. Id. at 2572.
147. Id. at 2566 (citing Cabell v. Markham, 326 U.S. 404 (1945); Boston Sand
& Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41 (1928); United States v. American
Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534 (1940)).
148. Id. (citing Bock Laundry, 109 S. Ct. at 1981).
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In Bock Laundry, the Court stated that "[w]here the literal meaning of a
statutory term would 'compel an odd result,' we must search for other
49
evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope."'
Therefore, although the Court agreed that the word "utilize" was unambiguous
on its face, the Court felt it necessary to consider the congressional intent of
FACA's legislative history before applying the FACA to the Standing

Committee.0s
Looking to the extensive records of the FACA legislative history for
guidance, the Court found few, if any, answers to the problem. In arguing
that Congress did not intend that FACA apply to the Standing Committee, the
Court relied mainly on Executive Order 11,007, issued by President Kennedy,
which governed the function of advisory committees until the FACA
1 51
passage.
According to the Court, the term "utilized" in the Order applied to
advisory committees formed by the government, or if the committee was not
formed by the government, then "'only during any period when [the
committee] is being utilized by a department or agency in the same manner
as a Government-formed advisory committee. '" 5 ' The Court claimed that
because the Standing Committee was formed privately instead of by the
government, and because the Committee received no federal funds from the
government, the Committee was not "utilized" the same as a Governmentformed advisory committee.'53
Secondly, although the Court noted that there was direct legislative
history which evidenced Congress' intent to widen the scope of the Executive
Order,'54 the Court argued there was still little reason to believe Congress
intended to encompass the ABA Committee.155 In the Court's opinion, the
principal purposes of the FACA, which were to make those committees
established by the government publicly accountable and to reduce any waste
of government expenditures, were not served by application to a private
organization receiving no federal funds. 56

149. Id. (citing Bock Laundry, 109 S. Ct. at 1984).
150. Id. at 2567.
151. Id. at 2567-69.
152. Id. at 2567.
153. Id. at 2568.
154. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1731, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1970); H.R. REP.
No. 1017, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972); S. REP. No. 1098, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5,
7 (1972)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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Finally, the Court analyzed the preliminary House and Senate bills in
reference to the final version of the FACA as approved by Congress. 157 The
earlier version of the House Bill applied only to advisory committees
"established" by statute or by the President.' 58 The House Committee
Report defined "advisory committee" to also include committees that were
formed before the President sought advice, but which were used by the
President in the same manner as a committee formed by the President.'59
Despite the apparent inclusiveness of the language, the Court chose to draw
an inference from an earlier House Report to determine that it was question-

able whether the authors of the House Report believed the Standing Commit-

tee was used in the same way as other advisory committees. 16
The Senate Bill, containing similar language to that used in the House
Bill, stated that the words "established or organized" by statute or the
President should be read in a liberal sense so as not to confine the inclusion
to only Government-funded committees.16 ' The Court argued, however, that
the FACA
the list of examples given by the Senate Report inferred that
62
included only those groups that were "quasi-public" in nature.
In the end, the Court admitted that the final version of the FACA
contained the phrase "established or utilized," but suggested that the "genesis"
of the FACA defined its scope. 63 Therefore, the majority concluded that
the word "utilized" was merely added to clarify that the FACA applies only
to committees established by the government and committees formed
indirectly by "quasi-public" organizations."
After a review of the FACA legislative history, the majority could only
conclude that it was a "close question" as to whether the FACA could be
construed to encompass the Standing Committee. 6 5 Although the statute's
broad language was inclusive, the Court believed the evidence of congressional intent to the contrary was sufficient to conclude with fair confidence 66that
Congress did not intend the FACA to apply to the Standing Committee.

157. Id. at 2569-72.
158. Id. at 2569 (citing H.R. 4383, 92d Cong, 2d Sess. § 3(2) (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3491, 3504).
159. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1017, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972)).
160. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1731, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1970)).

161. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1098, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972)).
162. Id. at 2569-70.
163. Id. at 2570.

164. Id. at 2570-71.
165. Id. at 2572.

166. Id.
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As a final and determining factor in its decision, the majority's
reluctance to address the constitutional question tipped the scale in their
favor. 67 According to Crowell v. Benson, the Court held that when the
constitutional validity of an Act by Congress is in question, the general rule
is that the "'Court will first ascertain whether a construction
of the statute is
'
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided. "6
In this case, the Court chose not to address the constitutional question
regarding the separation of powers doctrine because their review of the
legislative history revealed that Congress "probably did not intend" the FACA
to encompass the ABA Committee.' 69
2. Justice Kennedy's Response
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy asserted that the plain
language of the FACA should have been both the starting and stopping point
of the analysis. 170 He believed that the Court's approach to construe the
statute was an unhealthy attempt to amend the statute by judicial interpretation.'
In his opinion, the unwillingness of the Court to work within the
boundaries of the plain meaning of the words consequently "undermines the
legal process."'7
It is a basic rule of law that if the words of a statute are clear, the court
should be bound by those words unless such a construction would lead to
"patently absurd consequences."' 73 Justice Kennedy argued that this "narrow
exception" to the rule does not give the Court power to intrude on the law
making process of the Legislative Branch. 74
In this case, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court could not convincingly show that the plain meaning of the words produced an "absurd" result.
Thus, the majority turned to the legislative history to prove that the Congress
could not have intended such a result. 75 Utilizing this approach, the Court
employed the classic Holy Trinity doctrine which allows the court to look
beyond the plain meaning of the statute.176 The Holy Trinity argument
states that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

173.
174.

175.
176.

Id.
Id. (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
Id. at 2572-73.
Id. at 2574.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948)).
Id.
Id. at 2575-76.
Id. at 2576.
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because not within its spirit, not within the intention of its
the statute,
17 7
maker.

Justice Kennedy criticized the Holy Trinity doctrine because such an
approach allows a court to consult legislative materials to find the "spirit" of
the statute in order to discover an interpretation that better satisfies the court's
will. 178 In his view, the "spirit" of a statute reflects the view of the court
more than the view of the legislature that created the statute.
V. CONCLUSION

As illustrated by the Public Citizen decision, the role of legislative history
in statutory interpretation can draw a sharp dividing line in statutory analysis
within the Court. Ironically, Justice Scalia did not participate in the Public
Citizen decision-a decision which would have provided him an excellent
sounding board for his views on the use of legislative history.
With the resignation of Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court will
undoubtedly lose a controversial figure in the area of statutory interpretation.
As noted in several opinions, Justice Brennan divided the Court with his
analysis of legislative history of the particular statute. Although the departure
of Justice Brennan will not end the debate over the proper use of legislative
materials, his absence will undoubtedly alter the balance of viewpoints on the
new Court.
With the prolific amount of statutes enacted at both the state and federal
levels, the importance of predicting the interpretation of those statutes
becomes crucial to the legal profession. As a result, the changing composition
of the Supreme Court may ultimately prove to have a significant impact in the
area statutory interpretation.
LEIGH ANN MCDONALD

177. Id. (citing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)).
178. Id.
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